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Abstract 
We address the electoral consequences of profound welfare state reforms taking the German 
Agenda 2010 as an exemplary case. The Agenda is usually perceived as having developed 
into an electoral disaster for the German Social Democrats (SPD). In this article, we focus 
on the electoral reactions of directly affected labor market groups in four elections from 
1998 to 2009. We combine detailed meso-level information on the regional socio-economic 
structure with official elections results. Our findings indicate that the electoral effects of the 
reform on the group of ‘Agenda losers’ were limited, while the effect on the German party 
system and its coalition dynamics are more permanent as the reform helped to entrench a 
party left to the SPD in the German party system. 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time, the welfare state has been the resource for social democratic parties to mo-
bilize their electorate. But these happy times are long gone since; cutbacks and reforms 
dominate today. For Social Democracy this represents a particular challenge: should they 
adapt the welfare state to the requirements of a post-industrial, knowledge-based economy at 
the risk of losing the support of their core clientele, i.e. blue-collar workers? By continuing 
to protect the latter’s interests, however, social democratic parties would hardly win middle 
class votes and would risk remaining confined to the role of a permanent opposition 
(Kitschelt, 2001; Hopkin, 2004; Karreth et al., 2013). What is more, social democratic par-
ties are also confronted with divided interests within the working class due to labor market 
dualization and insider-outsider divides (Rueda, 2005, 2007; Emmenegger et al., 2012; 
Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Schwander, 2013).  
 
In this article we examine Social Democracy’s electoral fate among labor market groups that 
were directly affected by one of the most profound welfare state reforms in the last decades: 
the German Agenda 2010. Germany stands out as a paradigmatic case with regard to the ex-
tent of the reforms and the consequences for electoral competition. Often, the Agenda 2010 
is seen as a prerequisite for Germany’s current economic success (Eichhorst et al., 2010; 
Reisenbichler and Morgan, 2012). At the same time, the reform represents a clear and quite 
unexpected (see Kitschelt, 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck, 2004) departure from the traditional 
German social policy model (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006; Fleckenstein, 2008; Hassel and 
Schiller, 2010).  
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To examine the reform’s electoral effects, we employ a different methodological strategy 
than previous studies. We circumvent the limits of survey data – lack of combined infor-
mation on socio-economic status and political behavior plus serious problems of representa-
tiveness – by merging detailed data on the socio-economic situation in Germany’s over 400 
administrative districts with these districts’ official electoral records.  
 
To preview our main findings: we show that the Agenda 2010 had indeed detrimental elec-
toral effects for the German social democratic party (SPD), both directly and indirectly. As a 
direct effect, Agenda losers over-proportionally withdrew their support from the party. Yet, 
the indirect effects of the Agenda 2010 on party competition and party configuration are po-
tentially much more lasting. We show that the labor market reforms enabled a new socialist 
party, die Linke, to establish itself in the German party system because it achieved large vote 
gains in ‘Agenda loser’ regions. Moreover, we find that the reforms led many voters to ab-
stain – a trend potentially undermining political legitimacy in the long run.  
 
The paper speaks to three strands of literature: First, it contributes to the literature on the 
politics of dualization by analyzing the electoral consequences of a reform that reduced the 
privileges of insiders. More broadly, the paper contributes to the emerging literature on the 
electoral consequences of welfare state reforms (for an overview see Häusermann et al., 
2012). Despite common claims about the unpopularity of welfare state reforms, studies on 
their electoral consequences take a cross-country perspective and have yielded inconclusive 
results (Green-Pedersen, 2001, 2002; Armingeon and Giger, 2008; Giger and Nelson, 2011; 
Schumacher, 2011; Arndt, 2013). We, by contrast, concentrate on the electoral consequenc-
es in one country over several elections among reform losers and winners. This allows us to 
control for a range of other factors that may have also affected Social Democracy’s electoral 
 4 
fate. Third, the article speaks to the literature on party competition and welfare state reforms. 
In contrast to existing studies, we are not primarily interested in the way party competition 
conditions welfare state reforms (Kitschelt, 2001; Green-Pedersen, 2002), but in how wel-
fare state reforms affect party competition. Germany’s party constellation without a nation-
wide radical left contender for the SPD prior to the Agenda 2010, but its successful estab-
lishment in the aftermath of the reform, seems particulary suited for such a study. 
 
Our article is organized as follows: we first give a brief literature review. We then provide 
the reader with some information on the Agenda 2010, introduced in the legislative term 
2002-2005, and identify reform losers and winners. In Section 4, we develop our hypothe-
ses. Section 5 discusses our data and methods and presents our analysis. A short summary 
concludes.  
 
 
1. The electoral effects of welfare reforms 
Winning elections has become difficult for social democratic parties. Not only is their core 
constituency declining and are old party loyalities fading (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; 
Oesch, 2008; Bornschier, 2010). They are also confronted with strong divides within their 
electorate, both between middle class and working class voters (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 
1998; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015) and within the working class, which is divided in 
insiders and outsiders (Rueda, 2007; Emmenegger, et al., 2012; Häusermann and 
Schwander, 2012). As these voter segments have divergent economic interests in times of 
intensified distributive conflicts, social democratic parties are torn between these voters 
groups and must carefully consider whose interest to address primarily. 
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The literature on labor market dualization makes a clear prediction in this respect: social 
democratic parties will side with insiders because they are better organized politically and 
maintain strong party-links  – for example via trade unions (Rueda, 2006, 2007). Outsiders, 
by contrast, tend to be politically inactive (Rueda, 2007) or to vote for radical parties (King 
and Rueda, 2008; Marx, 2016). However, one could also argue that due to the increasing 
number of outsiders, the spread of labor market insecurity within the middle classes 
(Häusermann et al., 2014) and the high economic costs of the traditional insider protection 
model, social democratic parties have electoral incentives to reduce insiders’ privileges as 
this enables them to mobilize the middle class and outsiders (Schwander, 2013). Electoral 
gains among the middle class, however, might be short-lived only (Karreth, et al., 2013), 
and the mobilization of outsiders might be difficult due to their low political and economic 
knowledge and their low interest in politics. 
 
Yet, not only party-voter links might matter, but the strategic configuration of party systems 
as well. For instance, it has been argued that the left, not being associated by voters with an 
anti-welfare ideology, will arouse less political resistance when implementing unavoidable 
cuts (Ross, 2000; see also Kitschelt, 2001). Similarly, Green-Pedersen (2002) argues that 
left governments do a better job in justifying retrenchment as a cure to existing dys-
functionalities of the welfare state and as a mean to save-guard the welfare state as an insti-
tution of solidarity and social justice. Both strategies, however, work primarily if there is no 
rival party to attack the reform party, as is the case in plurality electoral systems or bloc par-
ty systems. This points more generally to the strategic configuration between parties 
(Kitschelt, 1999, 2001) as a crucial parameter in the electoral politics of welfare reform 
(Hopkin, 2004; Watson, 2008). Empirically, the growing literature on the relationship be-
tween welfare state reforms and electoral politics found equivocal results (Green-Pedersen, 
 6 
2001; Armingeon and Giger, 2008; Giger and Nelson, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Giger, 
2012; Häusermann et al., 2012; Arndt, 2013).  So, both theoretically and empirically, the 
electoral effects of welfare reforms are not clear-cut. Before discussing the distributive im-
plications of the Agenda 2010 for different labor market groups, we briefly describe the con-
tent of the reform project focusing on its labor market effects, exemplified in the Hartz 
Laws. 
 
 
2. Defrosting the German Welfare State: The Agenda 2010  
The Agenda 2010 represents a turn away from Germany’s traditional ‘social insurance’ wel-
fare state model (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007). 
Four so-called Hartz laws (named after the head of the reform commission, the former hu-
man resources officer of Volkswagen Peter Hartz) increased the activation orientation of the 
German welfare state and substantially reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits.   
 
The first two Hartz laws, enacted in 2003, strengthened labor market activation and tight-
ened benefit requirements. Once the spell of unemployment lasts longer than 18 months, un-
employed are forced to accept any available job, regardless of their original qualification 
and pay (Koch et al., 2009). A number of smaller policy measures were supposed to make 
work pay, e.g. via the reduction of social contributions on low-paid jobs or via secondary 
employment (‘mini-jobs’) or by facilitating small (and smallest) enterprises. The third Hartz 
law reformed the public employment service in order to improve management and place-
ment of jobseekers.  
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The last and most controversial Hartz law reformed the structure of the unemployment in-
surance. Originally, the German unemployment insurance was based on three pillars: unem-
ployed with full contribution records drew generous earning-related unemployment insur-
ance benefits for 32 months. Thereafter, unemployed depended on the less generous but still 
earning-related unemployment assistance for an unlimited period of time. Only those not 
qualified for unemployment insurance (e.g. marginally employed, those with incomplete 
contribution records or lone parents) had to rely on the flat-rate social assistance. Hartz IV 
reduced the drawing period for unemployment benefits drastically from 32 to 12 months for 
those below the age of 55 and merged unemployment and social assistance to a single flat-
rate and means-tested benefit called Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II; colloquially called Hartz 
IV). In terms of generosity, ALG II corresponds roughly to the level of the former social as-
sistance benefit and entails much stronger conditionality, but provides better access to 
placement service and training measures. More than two thirds of the unemployed today rely 
on these means-tested benefits (Hassel and Schiller, 2010; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 
2007). Considering that the ‘old’ welfare system quite generously protected status and quali-
fications of skilled workers, the tighter job acceptability conditions, the stricter sanctions 
and the shorter drawing period for earning-related benefits represent a profound break with 
the past. Table 1 provides a synopsis of the four reform measures. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Obviously, these reforms cut deep into vested interests. But who exactly lost and who 
gained from the Agenda project? 
 
3. Losers and Winners of the Agenda 2010 
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The distributive consequences of the reforms were complex. In the wake of the reforms, un-
employment decreased steadily to less than 5 percent today – cut by more than half com-
pared to the level that had prevailed at the peak of the crisis in 2005. In public debate, the 
Agenda is commonly perceived as having been crucial for Germany’s economic turnaround 
(among experts, however, this remains controversial). With today less than 3 million unem-
ployed experts consider a full employment scenario in the foreseeable future possible. If we 
see full employment as Social Democracy’s classical policy promise,1 one could expect an 
approving electoral reaction even of vulnerable labor market groups. Moreover, the reduc-
tion in the number of jobless people did not – as critiques of the reforms had claimed – come 
at the cost of undermining the ‘normal’ segment of the labor market. The number of the 
‘regularly employed’, i.e. those subject to mandatory social insurance membership, in-
creased significantly from its low point of slightly more than 26 million in 2005 to 30.5 mil-
lion in 2015, with 520’000 open positions currently. Experts expect 300’000 new jobs in 
2015 (Berufsforschung, 2015). Being in full-time, non-temporary employment is still the 
dominant employment form in Germany, for 40 percent of those of working age and for 60 
percent of all in gainful employment (Eichhorst and Tobsch, 2014: 10). The major achieve-
ment of the Agenda was to reduce the inactivity rate from 24 percent in 2002 to 19 percent 
in 2012 (Eichhorst and Tobsch 2014). In the EU, the German employment rate today is with 
77.5 % second only to the Swedish, while it was at rank 16 only ten years ago. And although 
the reform of course produced real losers, some household categories, in particular single 
mothers, benefitted from higher transfers (Koch, et al., 2009: 249-50). By contrast, the rap-
idly increasing low wage sector (see Rhein, 2013) is a more worrisome development which 
may weight strongly in the assessment of the reforms by those potentially affected. 
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In terms of consequences of the Agenda 2010 for the social democratic electorate, we identi-
fy five directly affected groups. First of all, the reform project deprived industrial workers of 
a large part of their traditional privileges. The German industry, based on the model of di-
versified qualified production (Streeck, 1992; Hall and Soskice, 2001), requires skilled 
workers. Protecting skill investments through generous unemployment insurance and strict 
employment protection was one of the main functions of the traditional German welfare 
state (Manow, 1997; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Manow, 2002; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
The Agenda reforms significantly violated interests of skilled insider workers and their un-
ions (Hassel and Schiller 2010). Hence, we consider them to be clear losers of the reform 
(contra Palier and Thelen, 2010; and Thelen, 2014). 
 
Equally, the reduction and tightened conditionality of unemployment benefits affects the un-
employed. Accordingly, the resistance to the Agenda 2010 was particularly pronounced in 
regions with high unemployment rates such as East Germany, Hamburg, the Ruhr area and 
the Saarland (Hassel and Schiller 2010). While the Agenda is associated with substantially 
lower unemployment on the macro-level, those who remain unemployed receive lower ben-
efits and are subjected to stricter conditionality. This holds in particular for long-term unem-
ployed. While they are (on average) less hurt by the reduction of the unemployment benefit 
as most of them already relied on the much less generous unemployment assistance, they are 
now subjected to stronger conditionality. For example, ALG II recipients are forced to ac-
cept any job (Clasen and Goerne, 2014). The merger of the two tiers brought also a benefit 
reduction for some groups of long-term unemployed: About 60 % of the former unemploy-
ment assistance recipients are financially worse off after the reform while most former social 
assistant recipients enjoy marginal increases in their benefits (Becker and Hauser, 2006). 
And although all long-term unemployed now have access to new activation programs and 
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improved placement services – which was previously dependent on type of benefit and geo-
graphical location (Clasen and Goerne, 2014) – we assume that those who remained unem-
ployed, i.e. those not put back to work by these programs, belong to the Agenda losers. 
 
The reforms had also negative effects for elderly unemployed. Previously, unemployed over 
the age of 58 were not expected to return to the labor market. The unemployment scheme 
was informally (mis-)used as a pre-early-retirement scheme (Manow and Seils, 2000). The 
Agenda 2010 did not only close this exit option by reducing the duration of the unemploy-
ment insurance benefit but specifically emphasized the need to rise employment among the 
elderly. In 2008, the so called 58-rule, according to which unemployed above this age were 
not expected to seek employment was formally abolished.  
 
For low-skilled individuals the reform had ambiguous effects, but given that individuals 
weight losses stronger than gains, we count them among the reform losers. With regard to 
benefits they belong to the winners: Households with an income just below the ‘basic securi-
ty’ and those who newly qualify for the basic security scheme (as in contrast to the old so-
cial assistance) belong to the reform-winners (Koch, et al., 2009: 249-50), because of new 
rules how to weight own income and wealth against welfare transfers. In contrast, middle-
income unemployed are major losers (Trampusch, 2005; Clasen and Goerne, 2014). Similar-
ly, Hassel and Schiller (2010: 47) argue that the reform project was most successful in re-
ducing ‘hidden’ poverty and long-term unemployment, which affects individuals with low 
skill endowment most strongly. At the same time, Germany witnesses a rapid expansion of 
the low-wage sector (Rhein, 2013). This threatens low-wage workers who fear to be re-
placed by cheaper and more flexible workers. 
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Taken together, we assume that the social democratic party experiences the strongest elec-
toral setback in the districts particularly negatively affected by the reform, i.e. in regions 
with a high share of unemployed, long-term unemployed, elderly unemployed, industrial 
employment and low-skilled individuals in regular employment.  
 
The literature on party competition and the electoral feasibility of welfare state reforms 
states that a left rival party prevents a social democratic party to implement substantial wel-
fare state reforms (Ross, 2000; Kitschelt, 2001; Green-Pedersen, 2002). In Germany, by 
contrast, a radical challenger established itself nationally after (and presumably because of) 
the SPD’s welfare reforms. If the de-alignment between the Agenda losers and the SPD real-
ly facilitated the electoral breakthrough of die Linke (the left), we should observe the oppo-
site effect on the outcome of die Linke. This is our party competition hypothesis: the left 
should gain in the districts with a high share of Agenda losers.  
 
Yet, the Agenda produced also winners. The reforms’ biggest winner was the higher income 
middle class, specifically those with low unemployment risks. The reforms allowed for a 
substantial shift of welfare state expenses from the unemployment insurance to other pur-
poses with a stronger middle class appeal like – for instance – health, child- or elderly-care. 
In addition, contributions for the unemployment insurance were lowered from 6.5 percent in 
2005 to 2.8 percent in 2009 as a consequence of the reform. Accordingly, we expect the so-
cial democratic party to achieve higher support in regions with higher shares of Agenda 
winners.  
 
We turn now to our empirical analysis. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
Existing studies on the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms usually rely on sur-
vey data. These data, however, suffer from a lack of combined information on socio-
economic status and political behavior. In addition, marginalized social groups are seriously 
underrepresented in survey data. Given the problems of survey data in the context of our re-
search question, we rely on two alternative data sources: administrative2 data provide us 
with a unique range of socio-economic indicators at the district level. We match these data 
with official electoral results from the Federal Returning Officer.3 Our data come from 406 
administrative districts (Landkreise or Kreisfreie Städte) in four federal elections (1998, 
2002, 2005, and 2009), i.e. we have 406 × 4 = 1,636 observations. 
 
We are interested in whether the social democratic party (/the left) loses (wins) over-
proportionally in districts with a high share of Agenda losers. Thus, our dependent variable 
is the SPD’s (/the left’s) vote share at the district level. Subsequently, we analyze the effect 
of the Agenda on electoral participation. For disappointed voters, abstention is analternative 
to vote switching, in particular for socially marginalized groups with limited political 
knowledge (Brady et al., 1995; Schäfer et al., 2016). Taking turnout into account is im-
portant because welfare cutbacks might alienate certain groups from the democratic process 
(Mahler, 2008; for Germany see Schäfer, 2011).4 Yet, it is also important from a strategic, 
partisan view: if those negatively affected by reforms abstain, the electoral consequences for 
a party are less severe, and the need to change course apprears less imperative. Put different-
ly: the trade-off between newly gained middle class votes and lost working class votes turns 
out to be less steep when workers simply abstain. 
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Our independent variables of theoretical interest are the district shares of unemployed, the 
long-term and the elderly unemployed, industrial workers and the low-skilled in regular em-
ployment. We aggregate these groups with a factor analysis to an index of ‘Agenda losers’. 
‘Agenda winners’ are measured by the share of high-skilled employment of total employ-
ment at the district level.5 Since we are interested in the deviation of our groups from the 
general vote swing (King et al., 2008) we account for the general swing by including the 
SPD’s vote share at state level, or by controlling for the vote share of die Linke or the turn-
out at state level in models 2 and 3. We also control for the average income at district level.6 
For more details see Appendix A.   
 
Two methodological comments are warranted. Since we are interested in the changes of the 
party’s electoral success over time, the models display the interaction between one of our 
independent variables and an election-dummy. The constitutive term for each independent 
variable measures the electoral success in the 1998 election, the interaction terms measure 
the success in the subsequent elections.7 Coefficients in interaction models cannot be direct-
ly interpreted as effects (Brambor et al., 2006; Kam and Franzese, 2007). Differentiation is 
one possible way to interpret coefficients since ‘first derivatives or first differences are ef-
fects’ (Kam and Franzese, 2007: 22). From our regression equation 
Y = βo+ βx X +βxz ZX +βz Z + e      (1) 
it follows that the net effect of each of our independent variables is: 
dy/dx =  βx + βxz Z        (2) 
Since the election variable enters as a dummy, adding the constitutive and the interaction ef-
fects indicates the net effect of an independent variable in a given election.  
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Second, our longitudinal design requires us to address serial autocorrelation and un-
observed unit-specificities. Fixed effects regression models (FE) and first difference regres-
sion models (FD) are both able to deal with these methodological challenges. The choice be-
tween the two depends on the theoretical interest. FE express a sustained and long-term ef-
fect of a variable while FD show its immediate effect because after one time lag, the effect is 
not taken into account anymore. Consequently, FE is more appropriate for events that occur 
only once in a lifetime and are therefore more likely to have a lasting effect (Giesselmann 
and Windzio, 2012: 64f). As the Agenda reforms represent such a unique event and we ex-
plicitly assume a lasting impact of the reforms on the relationship between the loser groups 
and the SPD’s electoral outcome, we report the results of fixed effects regression models 
with random slopes (FE). The fixed effects control for the unobserved unit-specificities by 
the subtraction of the unit-specific mean (Snijders and Bosker, 1999), while the random 
slopes allow the effect of the independent variables to vary over time (Giesselmann and 
Windzio, 2012). Due to heteroskedasticity in our data all models employ district-clustered 
standard errors.8 
 
Let us now turn to the empirical analysis. Table 2a displays in Model 1 the estimates for the 
SPD’s relative electoral success among the loser groups at the district level. Models 2 and 3 
show the relationship between these groups and the outcome of die Linke and vote absten-
tion respectively. This allows us to examine our party competition hypothesis: If the de-
alignment between the Agenda losers and the SPD enabled the electoral breakthrough of die 
Linke, its electoral performance should be the mirror-image of the SPD’s outcome. Vote ab-
stention represents another alternative for disappointed Agenda losers.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2a]   
 15 
 
We gain two insights from Table 2a. First, we see that the SPD’s electoral decline among 
the Agenda losers did not occur earlier than 2009, presumably because losers realized that 
the generally positive effect of the reforms on employment prospects had not altered their 
fate, and it was only then the radical contender of the Social Democrats, die Linke, had firm-
ly established itself in the national party system. In 1998, the SPD won below average in 
districts with a high share of those labor market groups that later were to suffer by the re-
forms. But in 2002, the promise to reduce unemployment rates that dominated the SPD’s 
electoral campaign raised hope for an economic upswing and our groups voted in large 
numbers for the SPD. The positive effect was particularly strong among the unemployment 
and long-term unemployed while industrial employment und employment among low-
skilled individuals had a negative effect on the SPD’s outcome in 2002 (results available 
form the authors). It seems that the industrial workers and the low-skilled individuals, both 
groups already in employment, considered the SPD’s reform plans more skeptically than 
those outside the labor force. In 2005, the interaction coefficient is still positive but not sig-
nificant anymore. In 2009, then, the interaction turns definitively negative. Taken together 
the results confirm our first hypothesis that the Agenda 2010 led to a de-alignment between 
the SPD and that part of their core constituency that was negatively affected by the reform.  
 
This brings us to our party competition hypothesis. If the hypothesis that the electoral break-
through of die Linke is a direct consequence of the de-alignment of the SPD and the Agenda 
losers is correct, we would expect die Linke to do well where the SPD fared badly. Model 2 
in Table 2a shows exactly this: the social democrats’ radical contender wins significantly 
more votes in the Agenda loser districts in 2009 and 2005, but less in 2002. Vote abstention 
is another reaction to the Agenda reform by disappointed voters. Model 3 shows that ab-
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staining was a frequent response in Agenda loser districts in 2002 and 2005 until die Linke 
presented itself as a viable party alternative in 2009. While low turnout rates especially 
among disadvantaged groups are worrisome from a democratic point of view, vote absten-
tion limits the electoral damage for the SPD. As long as disappointed voters abstained, con-
sequences for the SPD were less disastrous as compared to 2009, when disappointed voters 
turned in large numbers to die Linke.  
 
Table 2b shows the same analysis for the winners of the Agenda 2010. As our third hypothe-
sis expects, the Agenda led to a closer alignment between the winners of the reforms and the 
SPD. Model 1 in Table 2b shows that the positive effect of high-skilled employment, our in-
dicator of ‘Agenda winners’, on the SPD vote share increases over time.9 Again, the out-
come is inverted for the Linke (Model 2). Unsurprisingly, Model 3 confirms that vote ab-
stention is not prevalent among the winners  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2b]  
 
The SPD’s electoral fortune among the Agenda winners indicates that the SPD gained votes 
in middle class districts in 2005 and to a lesser extent also in 2009. Hence, it appears that the 
Agenda 2010 made the SPD lose their core voters but allowed the party to bind the middle 
class voters on a more longterm basis contradicting recent findings by Karreth, et al. (2013). 
Yet, the gains among the middle class were not sufficient to prevent the electoral disaster in 
2009 and the nearly 10 percent of former SPD voters that turned to die Linke in 2005 
(around 7 percent in West Germany) were sufficient for this party’s electoral breakthrough 
in the West.10  
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However, given that our analysis remains at the aggregate level, we are well advised to 
check our regression results with individual level data on German election studies (CSES 
waves 1-3). More precisely, we calculate the predicted probabilities to vote for the SPD, die 
Linke or to abstain for four labor market groups (the survey does not differ between long- 
and short-term unemployed) and compare these with the overall probability of voting for the 
SPD (or die Linke or to abstain). Table 3 reports the general trend as well as the predicted 
probability to vote for the SPD, die Linke or to abstain for each of the four elections under 
investigation. These individual-level results confirm the electoral trends among our four 
groups that we observed at the district level (see Appendix C). The turn towards die Linke 
and away from the SPD is especially pronounced among the unemployed, the older unem-
ployed and the low-skilled employed, and plays out particularly strong in the 2009 election. 
We note, however, the extremely small number of observations for certain labor market cat-
egories – an important reason why we had pursued our analysis on the aggregate level in the 
first place. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3]  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In the last decade, Germany surprised scholars with profound welfare state and labor market 
reforms. Previously considered as the epitome of institutional inertia (Kitschelt, 2003; 
Kitschelt and Streeck, 2004), the Agenda 2010 represents a clear departure from the tradi-
tional German social policy model toward a more activation based welfare state with a clear 
flexibilization of the labor market. From the perspective of the insider-outsider theory who 
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see social democratic parties as representatives of insiders, the Agenda 2010 should never 
have happened and indeed the reforms was met with fierce public resistance. The SPD – as 
the responsible party – had to endure d not only a plummet in public approval and electoral 
support but also the permanent establishment of a challenger to its left.  
 
In our article, we explore the electoral fallout of the Agenda 2010 among traditional social 
democratic clienteles. We are especially interested to learn how the SPD fares among those 
directly affected by the reform, which we identify as the low-skilled, industrial workers, and 
the unemployed, in particular the elderly and long-term unemployed. We expected that the 
SPD loses among these groups because of the Agenda’s negative distributive effects for 
them. At the same time, we link the entrenchment of a new left party, die Linke, in the Ger-
man party system to the SPD’s electoral losses. Although there is growing academic interest 
in the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms, many of these questions have re-
mained unanswered as of yet due to the lack of adequate data. Existing studies usually rely 
on survey data, which suffer from a lack of combined information on socio-economic status 
and political behavior. In addition, marginalized social groups are seriously underrepresent-
ed in survey studies putting their representivity in question. To overcome these problems, 
we analyze the electoral consequences of the Agenda 2010 at the district level combining 
detailed information about the social and economic structure of districts with ‘hard’ data on 
the electoral outcome. We find our three basic assumptions confirmed by the empirical 
analysis. First, the Agenda 2010 alienated the SPD from parts of its core constituency. Se-
cond, the new party to its left, die Linke, could benefit from this growing enstrangement be-
tween voters and the social democratic party. Thirdly, middle class voters on average re-
warded the SPD for its reform efforts (Karreth, et al., 2013). 
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In addition to the reform’s direct electoral effects, we also find that the Agenda 2010 had in-
direct consequences for the electoral prospects of the SPD by altering the party constella-
tion. Mainly as a consequence of the Agenda 2010, the East German and ex-communist PDS 
managed to establish itself firmly in the German party system under the new label die Linke 
(the left) representing a fetching party alternative for diasppointed SPD voters. In this arti-
cle, we do not examine the party choice of insiders and outsiders beyond the support for the 
SPD and the decision to abstain from elections. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
CDU represents an appealing alternative for disappointed insiders due to its long-established 
image as co-founder of the Bismarckian welfare state, which holds up the traditional values 
of equivalence principle and seniority rules that are so dear to insiders.  
When the Christian democrats aborted their 2005-experiment to position themselves as even 
more neo-liberal than the ‘modernizing’ Schröder-government in 2009 and returned to the 
political center, the SPD found itself squeezed between a welfare state-friendly CDU and an 
orthodox left challenger: this spelled electoral disaster, in particular since the previous elec-
tion had firmly established die Linke nationally. The 2009 Social Democracy’s spectacular 
fall from voters’grace was therefore due to a compound effect in which the Agenda’s party-
system effects and its electoral effects, i.e. the growing estrangement between certain labor 
market groups and the SPD, conspired. The German case shows that the electoral fallout of 
profound welfare reforms might come with a lag, and different lag-structures might explain 
why previous comparative studies could only come up with rather equivocal findings.  
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Appendix A - Table of operationalization and descriptive information 
Variable name Variable operationalization Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Share of SPD votes  Share of SPD votes at district level 33.24 10.66 10.18 64.32 
SPD state outcome Vote share of the SPD at state level 33.22 9.32 14.60 52.40 
Share of die Linke 
votes on district level Share of die Linke votes at district level 7.41 8.48 0.25 37.04 
die Linke state out-
come  Vote share of die Linke at state level 7.46 8.38 0.70 32.60 
Abstention on district 
level 
1-(valid votes on district level/eligible 
votes at district level)*100 23.10 5.76 11.21 42.15 
Abstention of state 
level 
1-(valid votes on state level/eligible 
votes at state level)*100 22.75 5.02 15.15 39.18 
Agenda losers 
Factor analysis of unemployment rate, 
share of elderly unemployed, share of 
long-term unemployed, share of indus-
trial employment and share of low-
skilled employed, all at district level 
(EV:1.90, retained factors: 1) 0.00 1.00 -1.91 3.65 
Unemployment rate 
Share of unemployed on civilian em-
ployment at district level, in % 7.36 3.44 1.80 20.50 
Share of elderly unem-
ployed 
Share of unemployed aged 55 and older 
of total unemployment at district level, 
in % 16.41 5.34 6.10 44.20 
Long-term unem-
ployed 
Share of unemployed, 1 year and long-
er, of total unemployment at district 
level,  in % 32.75 7.19 9.90 59.20 
Industrial employment 
Share of employment subject to social 
contributions in secondary sector of to-
tal employment subject to social contri-
butions at district level, in % 29.44 8.96 6.90 64.00 
Low-skilled employ-
ment 
Share of low-skilled employed subject 
to social contributions of total employ-
ment subject to social contributions at 
district level, in % 28.65 4.97 13.50 42.00 
Agenda winners 
High-skilled employment: Share of 
employees with tertiary degree per 100 
inhabitants at district level, in % 3.77 3.05 0.50 29.70 
Arg. Household in-
come 
Disposable income per household in 
Euro per inhabitant, at district level 
1402.
4 213.2 929.1 2585 
 
  
 25 
 
Appendix B  - Robustnessttests 
 
 
SPD Linke Abstention    
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Agenda losers -0.489* -1.125*** -0.221    
 
(0.19) (0.26) (0.14)    
1998 [ref.] 
   
    2002 -0.648*** -3.903*** 0.322*   
 
(0.17) (0.25) (0.15)    
2005 -1.055*** -5.412*** 0.520*   
 
(0.28) (0.35) (0.22)    
2009 -2.434*** -14.845*** 1.169**  
 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.39)    
1998*losers [ref.] 
   
    2002*losers 0.427*** 2.388*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.10)    
2005*losers 0.154 1.198*** 0.227**  
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.09)    
2009*losers -0.380** -0.267 0.252*   
 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.12)    
SPD state outcome 0.940*** 
  
 
(0.02) 
  Die Linke state outcome  -0.752*** 
  (0.04)  
Abstention on state level  0.942*** 
      (0.03)    
Avg. Household income 0.004*** 0.006*** -0.001    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
East Germany  -4.622*** 1.804 -3.315*** 
 
(1.10) (1.44) (0.62)    
Constant 3.507 44.488*** 7.615*** 
 
(1.90) (1.99) (1.04)    
R2 0.989 0.980 0.980    
Observations 1608 1608 1608    
Values in parentheses are standard errors; Regression includes district dummies 
(not shown); * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** 
= significant at the 0.01 level 
Table B.1: Regressions controlling for East-West differences 
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SPD-West SPD-East Linke-West Linke-East Abst-West Abst-East    
 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
Agenda losers -0.142 -1.636** -0.762*** 0.127 -0.293 -0.678    
 
(0.26) (0.48) (0.15) (0.71) (0.17) (0.66)    
1998 [ref.] 
      
       2002 -0.472* -1.386 0.073 -1.383 0.743*** -1.641*   
 
(0.20) (0.76) (0.10) (0.87) (0.17) (0.75)    
2005 -1.100** 0.353 1.193*** -1.178 0.895** -1.913    
 
(0.34) (1.05) (0.24) (1.44) (0.28) (0.99)    
2009 -2.391*** -0.916 2.104*** 1.181 1.940*** -2.520    
 
(0.68) (1.94) (0.39) (1.88) (0.46) (1.39)    
1998*losers [ref.] 
      
       2002*losers 0.485** 1.134** -0.016 0.033 0.761*** 0.765    
 
(0.15) (0.36) (0.02) (0.36) (0.10) (0.39)    
2005*losers 0.236 0.417 0.569*** 0.763 0.643*** 0.706    
 
(0.15) (0.34) (0.08) (0.48) (0.11) (0.45)    
2009*losers -0.582** 0.584 1.088*** 0.146 0.524*** 1.141*   
 
(0.22) (0.39) (0.12) (0.75) (0.16) (0.55)    
SPD state outcome 0.950*** 1.025*** 
    
 
(0.03) (0.08) 
    Linke state outcome 
  
0.860*** 0.772*** 
  
   
(0.05) (0.08) 
  Abstention on state  
    
0.892*** 0.968*** 
level 
    
(0.03) (0.05)    
Avg. household  0.004** -0.000 -0.002* 0.004 -0.001 0.007    
income (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)    
Constant -3.007 1.500 2.520* 0.083 3.241* -5.054    
  (2.32) (5.10) (1.07) (7.16) (1.58) (5.46)    
R2 overall 0.740 0.895 0.901 0.755 0.697 0.859    
R2 0.975 0.982 0.963 0.924 0.969 0.964    
Observations 1300 308 1300 308 1300 308    
Values in parentheses are standard errors; Regression includes district dummies (not shown); * = significant at the 0.1 
level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table B.2: Regression models for East and West Germany separately 
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Appendix C - Number of respondents in each group per election report-
ing also information about their electoral behavior 
 
 
Election Unemployed Older unempl. Low-skilled empl. Industrial empl. 
1998 40 10 119 272 
2002 89 26 118 399 
2005 122 27 658 456 
2009 82 20 1 19 
Total 333 83 896 1146 
Source: CSES waves 1-3 (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
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Table 1: Overview of Hartz reforms  
Reform Place of action Change 
Hartz I  
(Jan 2003) 
Placement • Personal-Service Agentur (temporary work agency), 
placement voucher 
 Benefits 
 
• Tighter definition of suitable work 
• More flexible sanction regime 
   
Hartz II  
(Jan 2003) 
Increase labor 
supply 
• Tax/Benefit incentives for low wage and complemen-
tary jobs (Mini-jobs) 
• Self-employment (Ich-AG) 
   
Hartz III  
(Jan 2004) 
Placement  • Organizational reform of Public Employment Service 
   
Hartz IV  
(Jan 2005) 
Benefits 
 
Previously:  
• For insiders: up to 32 months: 60(67*)%, then 
53(57*)% unlimited 
• For outsiders: social assistance 
  Merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance 
to Unemployment benefit II (ALG II ,“Hartz IV”) 
• For insiders: 12 months: 67%, then ALG II 
• ALG II: flat-rate benefit, 345 € in West Germany, 331 € 
in Eastern Germany (single adult) plus housing costs, so-
cial contributions, access to placement service 
  • Tighter definition of suitable work 
* for claimants with dependent children 
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Table 2a: The electoral outcomes in Agenda loser districts from 1998-2009 
 
SPD Die Linke Abstention    
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Agenda losers -0.489* -0.479** -0.221    
 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.16)    
1998 [ref.] 
   
    2002 -0.648*** 0.078 0.322    
 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.17)    
2005 -1.055*** 1.100*** 0.520*   
 
(0.32) (0.24) (0.26)    
2009 -2.434*** 2.086*** 1.169**  
 
(0.59) (0.38) (0.44)    
1998*losers [ref.] 
   
    2002*losers 0.427** -0.033 0.336**  
 
(0.13) (0.08) (0.10)    
2005*losers 0.154 0.411*** 0.227*   
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09)    
2009*losers -0.380* 0.780*** 0.252    
 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13)    
SPD state outcome 0.940*** 
  
 
(0.03) 
  Die Linke state outcome 
 
0.827*** 
 
  
(0.04) 
 Abstention on state level 
 
0.942*** 
   
(0.03)    
Avg. Household income 0.004** -0.002* -0.001    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -2.100 2.940** 2.247    
  (1.88) (1.03) (1.45)    
R2 overall 0.752 0.960 0.769    
R2 0.976 0.948 0.966    
Observations 1608 1608 1608 
Districts 406 406 406 
Values in parentheses are standard errors; regression with robust standard errors; 
* = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at 
the 0.01 level. 
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Table 2b: The electoral outcomes in Agenda winner districts from 1998-2009 
 
SPD Die Linke Abstention    
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Agenda winners -0.022 0.109 0.407*** 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11)    
1998 [ref.] 
   
    2002 -1.324*** 0.653*** 0.382    
 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.20)    
2005 -1.829*** 1.503*** 0.588*   
 
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30)    
2009 -1.911*** 2.334*** 1.520**  
 
(0.55) (0.48) (0.50)    
1998* winners [ref.] 
   
    2002*winners 0.207*** -0.055* -0.055    
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)    
2005*winners 0.239*** -0.094* -0.063    
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
2009*winners 0.098* -0.086 -0.236*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)    
SPD state outcome 0.987*** 
  
 
(0.02) 
  Die Linke state outcome 
 
0.914*** 
 
  
(0.03) 
 Abstention on state level 
  
1.000*** 
   
(0.02)    
Avg. Household income 0.004** -0.004** -0.002    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -4.455** 4.947** 1.434    
  (1.71) (1.53) (1.72)    
R2 overall 0.771 0.968 0.783    
R2 0.977 0.943 0.968    
Observations 1624 1624 1624 
Districts 406 406 406 
Values in parentheses are standard errors; regression with robust standard errors; * = 
significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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 Baseline model Unemployed Older unemployed Low-skilled 
employed 
Industrial workers 
 SPD Die 
Linke 
Abst-
ention 
SP
D 
Die 
Linke 
Abst-
ention 
SP
D 
Die 
Linke 
Abst-
ention 
SP
D 
Die 
Linke 
Abst-
ention 
SP
D 
Die 
Linke 
Abst-
ention 
199
8 0.43 
0.05 0.06 0.4
8 
0.07 0.25 0.5
3 
0.01 0.03 0.4
8 
0.05 0.07 
0.45 
0.05 0.04 
200
2 0.44 
0.07 0.04 0.3
9 
0.14 0.11 0.5
7 
0.11 0.07 0.4
6 
0.07 0.05 
0.48 
0.06 0.04 
200
5 0.33 
0.09 0.06 0.3
0 
0.22 0.15 0.3
4 
0.09 0.08 0.3
2 
0.06 0.03 
0.30 
0.09 0.05 
200
9 0.23 
0.11 0.14 0.1
4 
0.21 0.47 0.2
0 
0.17 0.21 0.2
3 
0.14 0.13 
0.40 
n.E. 0.15 
Source: CSES, waves 1-3 (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009) 
The models control for age, gender, trade union membership, religiosity, education and income. 
Excluding those control variables does not change the results significantly. The baseline model 
is an empty model with only election dummies as independent variables.  
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1 And Chancellor Schröder put the fight against unemployment indeed repeatedly and publicly at the 
top of this political agenda during his electoral campaigns. 
2 Indikatoren und Karten zur Raumentwicklung (http://www.bbsr.bund.de) 
3 Wahlbezirkstatistik des Bundeswahlleiters (http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de) 
4 Accordingly, we checked the robustness of our results under the inclusion of vote turnout on state 
level. Results remained unchained. 
5 High-skilled individuals have low unemployment risks (Oesch, 2010; Häusermann, et al., 2014) and 
benefit particulary form the reduction of social contribution to the unemplyoment insurance system. 
This makes them double reform winners.  
6 We experimented with additional control variables such as the share of immigrants among the unem-
ployed, female labor market participation and others. Results did not change in any substantive way.  
7 There is a debate whether one always has to include both constitutive terms. Bambor et al. (2006: 67) 
make strong arguments in favor of inclusion because the omission of one of the constitutive terms 
‘may lead to biased estimates in multiplicative interactions models’ (see also Greene, 2003). In Kam 
and Franzese’s point of view, by contrast, including both constitutive terms is only mandatory if both 
explanatory variables have in independent effect on the dependent variable, i.e. when the other explan-
atory variable equals 0 (Kam and Franzese, 2007: 16-17). In our case, however, it is plausible to as-
sume that the election year itself has an effect on the electoral outcome of the Social democratic party 
if unemployment equals 0 even if we control for the SPD’s share at the state level. We therefore in-
clude both constitutive terms in the equation.   
8 Because fixed effects model do no allow controlling for the difference between West and East Ger-
many, we run a model that replaces the fixed effects with an East-West dummy (East = 1, West =0). 
Results show that the East-West dummy is significant for the models 1 and 3. To investigate this fur-
ther, we run the analysis separately for West and East Germany. For the 1998, 2002 and 2009 elec-
tions, the results are similar for both parts of Germany: The SPD wins under-proportionally in districts 
with a high share of the five loser groups in 1998, although the effect is particularly pronounced (and 
significant) in Eastern Germany. In 2002 and 2005, the party wins over-proportionally. The gain of the 
SPD’s vote share was particularly pronounced in the Agenda loser districts in Eastern Germany, an 
outcome we attribute not only to SPD Chancellor Schröder’s electoral promise to reduce unemploy-
ment but also to his immediate support for the victims of the flood that devastated large parts of East-
ern Germany in summer 2002, just a few weeks ahead of the elections. We find that the negative ef-
fect of the Agenda 2010 in 2009 on the SPD’s outcome is largely a Western result, while the SPD won 
in the Agenda loser districts in Eastern Germany in the same election. Die Linke, by contrast, gained 
an over-proportional share of votes in loser-districts in both parts of Germany, although the positive 
effect is much stronger in the West. The left already managed to win a disproportionate share of votes 
in Agenda loser districts in 2005. However, due to the low number of districts in Eastern Germany, the 
coefficients do not reach significance in the party models (results shown in Appendix B). 
9 We tested the robustness of this finding with different measurements for Agenda winners: average 
household income on district level, high-skilled employment in service sector and income*service 
sector employment. The results are robust in direction although weaker in size (results not shown). 
10 We conducted the analysis separately for East and West Germany (see Appendix D). The results for 
West Germany equal the results for entire Germany. By contrast, the SPD loses predominantly and 
increasingly due to die Linke in Eastern Germany while voter flows to the CDU are of less im-
portance. 
 
 
